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Abstract. Psychological and social systems provide us with a natural domain for the study of anticipations because these 
systems are based on and operate in terms of intentionality. Psychological systems can be expected to contain a model of 
themselves and their environments; social systems can be strongly anticipatory and therefore co-construct their 
environments, for example, in techno-economic (co-)evolutions. Using Dubois’ hyper-incursive and incursive 
formulations of the logistic equation, these two types of systems and their couplings can be simulated. In addition to their 
structural coupling, psychological and social systems are also coupled by providing meaning reflexively to each other’s 
meaning-processing. Luhmann’s distinctions among (1) interactions between intentions at the micro-level, (2) 
organization at the meso-level, and (3) self-organization of the fluxes of meaningful communication at the global level 
can be modeled and simulated using three hyper-incursive equations. The global level of self-organizing interactions 
among fluxes of communication is retained at the meso-level of organization. In a knowledge-based economy, these two 
levels of anticipatory structuration can be expected to propel each other at the supra-individual level.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The hyper-incursive formulation of the logistic equation—xt = axt+1(1 – xt+1) [1]—provides us with an 
operationalization of the concept of “double contingency” which has been central to the theory of social systems 
[2-7]. According to Luhmann [5:70], “double contingency” can be considered as the auto-catalyst of social 
processes between reflexive individuals.  
The concept of double contingency was first formulated by the Amercian sociologist Talcott Parsons, who 
defined “double contingency” in 1951 as follows:  
 
The expectation is not defined “Being what I am, alter’s treatment of me must take one of the following alternatives” 
but “Depending on which of several alternatives open to me I take, I will set alter a problem to which he will react in terms 
of the alternative system of his own which is oriented to my action.”[2:94]  
 
According to Parsons [3: 436], the theory of games could be considered as a most sophisticated analysis of the 
implications of double contingency. However, one can also specify the dynamics of expectations in terms of the 
theory of strongly anticipatory systems [8,9] and provide the above (formal) equation with the following 
(substantive) interpretation: Ego (at xt) operates on the basis of an expectation of its own next state (xt+1) and the 
next state of an Alter (1 – xt+1). Note that Alter is now defined in terms of Ego’s expectations; the relationship 
between expectations constructed in each human mind precedes a possible interaction between Ego and Alter. 
While Parsons based his definition mainly on American pragmatism [2,9], the German sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann elaborated on double contingency in the continental tradition. He based himself on Edmund Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. Husserl had concluded that “intersubjectivity” provides us with an intentionality 
different from and transcendental to subjectivity [10:144]. While subjective intentionality is a natural consequence 
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of the cogito of the cogitantes, intersubjective intentionality remains an uncertain cogitatum, that is, an inter-human 
construct of expectations. The two substances (or in Husserl’s wordings “monads”) are different to the extent that 
they can be considered as analytically independent [12,13].  
Husserl noted that he had no instruments beyond a transcendental apperception of this new domain and therefore 
had to refrain from its empirical investigation [11:138]. Luhmann [6,14] made the communication of meaning 
among human beings the focus of his sociology. The communication of meaning relates to the theory of anticipatory 
systems since meaning is provided to information from the perspective of hindsight. At each moment of time, the 
communication and degree of codification of meaning can be measured, for example, by using semantic maps 
[15,16]. By providing meaning to the historical events from the perspective of hindsight, a reflexive system 
generates a model of these events or—more precisely—the expected information values contained in series of 
events. Such a model can be used by a reflexive mind for the weak anticipation [1,17,18].  
When meanings can also be communicated between weakly anticipatory systems, a next-order layer of cogitata 
can be expected as a result. I shall argue that this construct can become strongly anticipatory, that is, co-constructing 
its own future states. For example, the techno-economic (co-)evolution in the social system reconstructs this system 
to the extent that more recently the (sub)dynamics of a knowledge-based economy has been constructed on top of 
the older—since informational—dynamics of markets [19,20].  
While biological systems can already provide meaning to the information [17,21] the differentia specifica of 
social and psychological systems is this processing of meaning. Meaning-processing systems can codify meaning 
into symbolic meaning and develop discursive reasoning. I follow Luhmann’s assumption [6,12,14] that meaning is 
communicated in social systems, but can be made conscious only by psychological systems.  
Using the incursive formulation of the logistic equation [xt = axt-1 (1 – xt)], the selection term (1- xt) provides 
observers with a weakly anticipatory model [18]. The social system contains an additional anticipatory mechanism 
because of its distributedness [22,23]. When these two (analytically different) anticipatory mechanisms operate upon 
each other, a strongly anticipatory system can be among the results [20]. This system of meaning-processing self-
organizes its knowledge base in terms of meanings which make a difference for the construction of its next stage. 
2. DOUBLE CONTINGENCY AND HYPER-INCURSIVITY 
Dubois’ formula for hyper-incursivity [1] captures the second (anticipatory) dimension of the double 
contingency in general. However, each other agent (e.g., yt) can be expected to maintain a similar set of 
expectations, but with potentially another parameter a and consequentially another relation to the future of itself and 
its environment. How is the development of double contingency dependent on this “bifurcation parameter” a? 
The equation can be rewritten as follows [1:9]:  
 
 )1( 11   ttt xaxx  (1) 
   2 11   ttt axaxx
   01
2
1   ttt xaxax
   0/1
2
1   axxx ttt
 
In general, the latter equation has two solutions [24]: 
 
 xt+1 = ½  ± ½ √[1 – (4/a) xt] (2) 
 
Given that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the curve x = 0.5 ± 0.5 √ (1 – (4/a)) for x = 1 sets limits to the possible values which can be 
reached by the hyper-incursive system. This line is penciled into Figure 1. In addition to the two domains of possible 
solutions of Equation 2 for a ≥ 4, Figure 1 shows the bifurcation diagram of the logistic equation for a < 4, and the 
steady state of the incursive equation [xt = axt-1 (1 – xt);  xt = xt-1 → x = (a – 1)/a] [24]. 
For a ≥ 4, two sets of expectations are hyper-incursively generated at each time step depending on the plus or the 
minus sign in the equation. After N time steps, 2N future states would be possible. Thus, this social system of 
expectations continuously needs a mechanism for making decisions between options.  Otherwise, the system would 
rapidly become overburdened with uncertainty [1:9]. The decisions are made in the layer of historically-rooted but 
weakly anticipatory systems. 
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FIGURE 1.  The social system as a result of hyper-incursion. 
 
Note that the logistic equation and its hyper-incursive (but not the incursive) formulation are symmetrical in t: 
the logistic curve refers exclusively to (t – 1) and the hyper-incursive equation to (t + 1). Because of this symmetry 
in the formulas, both systems can be expected to reach a limit value for a = 4.  
Can a also have values lower than four in the strongly anticipatory case? 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Possible penetrations of the social system into the biological variation (a < 4). 
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The term under the root in Equation 2 is positive for xt ≤ a/4: this condition is always met for a ≥ 4, but sets a 
borderline to the possible penetrations of the hyper-incursive (social) system into the biological variation (a < 4). In 
Figure 2, this limitation is elaborated for a = 1.2 and xt = 0.35. Since in a next step xt+1 would become 0.5, and thus 
larger than a/4 (= 0.3), the strongly anticipatory system would in this case not be able to proceed with a next step to 
xt+2. In general, the strongly anticipatory system can reconstruct the biological variation (e.g., technologically), but 
only for a relatively short period of time.1 
3. INTENTIONALITY, IDENTITY, AND REFLECTION 
Two more models can be derived from the logistic equation:  
 )1( 1 ttt xaxx  (3) 
 )1(1 ttt xaxx    (4) 
Equation 3 evolves into x = (a – 1)/a, that is, a constant for each value of a. This constant is equal to the steady state 
of the incursive equation [xt = axt-1 (1 – xt)]. This steady state can be derived from the incursive formulation of the 
logistic equation as follows [24]:  
 )1( 11   ttt xaxx  (3a) 
 11   tttt xaxaxx  (3b) 
 ttt axaxx  )1(1  (3c) 
 )1/(1 ttt axaxx   (3d) 
The steady state can be found by solving xt = xt+1 as follows: 
 )1/( axaxx   (5) 
 axaxx  )1(  (5a) 
  (5b) 0)1(2  xaax
 aaxx /)1(0    (5c) 
In other words, the incursive equation tends to converge on a steady state which can be considered as one of the 
available sub-dynamics of the strongly anticipatory system of meaning processing. The continuous line in Figure 1 
represents the function x = (a – 1)/a.  
This continuity allows the anticipatory system to maintain its identity for different values of a. Identity is based 
on the expectation of continuity of the “self” in the next stage of an anticipatory system while the aperture for the 
reflection—the parameter a—may vary. Note that institutions like individuals can be expected to develop an identity 
for organizing the communication of meaning in historical time. 
Equation 4 evolves into xt+1 = (1/a) [xt / (1 – xt)]. This routine formalizes the reflexive operation: when xt > [a / 
(1 + a)] a pulse is generated which first overshoots the value of one (in a virtual domain of possible expectations), 
but then generates a negative value (Figure 3). Dubois (personal communication, July 16, 2008) noted that Eq. 4 can 
be derived as the time inverse of his [1] incursive (Pearl-Verhulst) equation xt = axt-1 (1 – xt).2 However, the 
dynamics are different. 
                                                 
1 For a = 2, the hyper-incursive system has a single (“natural”?) solution at xt = 0.5. In the case of a < 4, there exists a basin of attraction of the for 
the fixed state (a – 1)/a of Equation 2 with the plus sign, such that if x0 is in this basin, and the hyperincursive decision rule allows the system to 
choose the plus equation, then xt will persist indefinitely. This never occurs when a < 3 (Marke Burke, personal communication, February 1, 
2008.)  
2 The demonstration is as follows:  
 )1( 11   ttt xaxx   
is equal to the following equation for dt = 1: 
 )1( dtttdtt xaxx     
The time reverse of this equation is obtaind for dt → –dt, with the negative discrete time –dt: 
 )1( dtttdtt xaxx     
or, with –dt = –1:  
 )1( 11   ttt xaxx   
continued > 
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FIGURE 3. Simulation of Equation 4: the value of x at t = 1 is drawn randomly (a = 4).3 
 
The negative value provides a mirror image of a representation at a specific moment in time, and thus allows for 
the reflection. Reflection enables us to bounce a communication between the subdynamics of communication 
systems. At the level of the social system, this subdynamic formalizes the reflexive operation of providing meaning 
with reference to a horizon of possible meanings [25]. 
In summary, the three (hyper-)incursive equations which contain the future state in the argument, specify the 
systemic processes of meaning-processing: identity formation (Equation 3), reflexivity (Equation 4), and the mutual 
expectation of expectations in the doubly contingent relations between reflexive systems (Equation 1). While 
identity and reflexivity are more commonly defined in social theory [26], double contingency could hitherto not be 
operationalized. From the perspective of the theory of anticipatory systems, the second dimension of the double 
contingency in intentional systems—that is, the expectation of expectations—provides us with a natural system of 
strong anticipations.  
4. DECISIONS AND HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES 
The hyper-incursive system (Equation 1) cannot further be developed (at a ≥ 4) without decisions taken by 
reflexive agents (or institutional agency) because of the continuous production of uncertainty. A psychological 
system can be considered as the minimal unit of reflection for making choices [27,28]. If decisions are socially 
organized—for example, by using decision rules—an institutional layer can increasingly be shaped. This 
institutional layer of organization provides a retention mechanism and therefore a hold for a next round of 
interacting expectations at the supra-individual level [29,30].  
In other words, the social system is dually layered as a forward-moving and information-processing retention 
mechanism versus sets of possible expectations which flow as intentions through the networks. The fluxes contain 
selections on Husserl’s “horizons of meaning” [25:89f.]. These possible horizons of meaning are not given, but 
continuously undergoing reconstruction while weakly anticipatory systems make decisions [31]. In other words, 
these systems co-evolve in two layers of strong and weak anticipation, respectively. When the communication 
becomes more complex, the communicative competencies of the carriers of the communication are challenged to 
                                                                                                                                                             
)1(1 ttt xaxx
So with a time translation of t → t +1 on the whole equation, one obtains:  
   (4)  
3 For a = 4, the pulse is generated for values of xt > 0.8. 
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improve their capacity by learning. The communication can further be developed when layers of codification can be 
sustained. Knowledge, for example, can be considered as a meaning that makes a difference; the exchange of 
knowledge as discursive knowledge requires more codification than the communication of meaning itself. 
Because the various equations are derived from the same logistic equation, the steady state of the weakly 
anticipatory system is equal to an available state of the strongly anticipatory system. However, the strongly 
anticipatory system contains more subdynamics than the weakly anticipatory one. Unlike individuals, the social 
system is not continuously tending towards integration, but can also operate in a distributed mode and further 
develop its differentiation into subsystems. When the social system is more integrated—as in a high culture—the 
system can be stable over long periods of time; the incursive routines prevail and tend towards a steady state. When 
the social system is more differentiated, the hyper-incursive equation begins to play a role because the subsystems 
can entertain expectations about the expectations entertained in other subsystems and thus generate a double 
contingency, that is, a strongly anticipatory mechanism at the level of the social system.  
In summary, the social system is complex and therefore composed of several subdynamics [21]. When, among 
the various subdynamics, the hyper-incursive routine prevails, pressure to take decisions increases. This can be 
experienced subjectively as time pressure; the system becomes less predictable because it increasingly co-constructs 
its own future states.4 This social system can be considered as “non-trivial” [33] and unexpected consequences of 
decisions can then increasingly be expected. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Simulation of the hyper-incursive equation (Equation 1) using MS Excel. 
 
Figure 4 shows the simulation of Equation 1 for different values of a (in the first row). I have highlighted cell 
D4. The formula bar in the Excel sheet reads: if the random number in cell A4 (in this case, 0.317611) is smaller 
than 0.5, the positive sign of the square root is used and otherwise the negative one. The evaluation is based on the 
value of a in row one (D1 = 4.1), and the previous solution of the equation in the above cell (D3 = 0.142160957). 
                                                 
4 Dubois [32: 208f.] defined “hyperincursion” as an incursion that generates multiple future states. 
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No
 can sometimes dwell in a specific state. Next-order 
me
mation processing. 
(The communication of meaning among the models will be addressed in a later section; at this level, it will be shown 
(below) that the self-organization of the interactions can also lead to a reduction of uncertainty.)  
te that for values of a < 4 (as in the B-column of Figure 3: a = 1.2), the number of steps is limited (as argued 
above). 
In this simulation, the decisions were made randomly at each next time-step. This leads to simulation results as 
provided in Figure 5. Figure 5 shows that the system
chanisms like institutionalization of the rule for decision-making can be expected to stabilize these configurations 
because decisions are then no longer taken randomly [34]. 
Note that because of the structural coupling of the development of the social system as a strongly anticipatory 
system of meaning processing to decision-making by weakly anticipatory systems, the reduction of the uncertainty 
is provided by the incursive routines, and not by the hyper-incursive fluxes of communication as perhaps suggested 
by the original model of autopoiesis [21,35]. The communication of meaning is more complex than is assumed in 
the autopoiesis model which is biologically inspired and focuses on the self-organization of infor
0
0.5
1
a = 4
a = 5
a = 6
a = 7
0 50 100 150 200 250
→t 
x ↑
a = 8
 
FIGURE 5. Trajectory of a social system based on random decisions of the decision-making units, for various values of the 
bif
odels are structurally coupled, “interpenetration” 
between the systems makes it possible for the two systems to develop further by using each other’s complex 
dynam
The logistic equation can be considered as a special cas
36
 
urcation parameter a. 
 
The difference between structural coupling at the level of information processing in biological systems and the 
structural coupling between the incursive and hyper-incursive meaning processing in strongly anticipatory systems 
has been expressed in qualitative theorizing as the difference between structural coupling and interpenetration 
[3:437,5, 6:286 ff.,14:210 ff.]. Psychological and social systems are not only coupled structurally, but their 
operations in the second contingency—the intentional layer—are additionally coupled because each system can 
provide meaning to its own operation and reflexively to the meaning-processing in the structurally coupled one. 
When not only the operational systems but also their anticipatory m
ics reflexively as relevant selection environments [28:174]. 
5. THE VARIOUS COUPLINGS OF MEANING-PROCESSING OPERATIONS 
e of the perturbed recursion model which Andersen 
[ :170 ff.] formulated as follows: 
),( 1 PSFS tt   (6) 
F is a recursive function that transforms the state St-1 into a new state St, using a set of parameters P = p1, …, pn. 
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Figure 6 shows the configuration when a system is continuously perturbed. The theory of autopoiesis further 
specifies that the system S itself makes a distinction between the parameters <p1…pn> (representing the 
environment) and its own state <s1…sn>. Since operationally closed, the system endogenously constructs and 
rep duces its boundaries. As I shall now show, these boundaries are constructed differently when a system has in 
addition to recursive routines also
 
[37:86 ff.] argued that in the case of operational closure and consequently autopoiesis the function (F) 
ould be considered as an operator of the communication s
as 
ro
 incursive ones available. 
 
FIGURE 6. The perturbed recursion model. Source: [36:170]. 
 
Baecker 
sh ystem (S) itself. Therefore, he reformulated Equation 6 
follows: 
 ),( ESSS   (7) 
This formulation leads to a paradox [38,39], but this paradox is a consequence of the static framework. Using the 
eory and computation of anticipatory systems, one can add ti
(of 
th me parameters to the different states and a subscript c 
coding; see below) to the operation as follows: 
 ),( 1 ESSS tct   (7a) 
This rewrite of the functionality by the system itself means that the system must be able to develop and repair 
itse
ntific 
com
m 
of communication into other subsystems, with a remaining term ε as representation of the residual environment. Let 
e use the lower-case c for the coding and s for this level of subsystems, a
 
subsystem itself proceeds historically, that is, from its state at (t – 1) to its 
state at t, meaning is provided to the development in the other subsystems from the perspective of hindsight. Thus, 
e can obtain the additional equation:   
lf operationally in addition to reproducing itself [36:174). The repair mechanism in communication is coding; the 
code of the communication enables a system to distinguish reflexively between signals and noise [40-42]. 
Following Parsons, Luhmann [6,14] added that codified meanings can be “condensed” in subsystems that are 
functionally differentiated. The functionality of the differentiation can be sustained if the subsystems are able to use 
the specificity of their respective codes for the reproduction of the system as a whole. Using the various codes, 
events can be appreciated differently within each subsystem; this diversity enables the system to process more 
complexity and can therefore be considered as functional to the further development of the system. The 
communications can then increasingly be refined. In the social system, for example, religious and scie
munications can be distinguished since the time of Galilei [43]. Similarly, political and scientific 
communications can be distinguished as based on providing different meanings to potentially the same events. 
When functionality of the differentiation among different symbolically generalized codes of communications 
prevails—that is, in modern and pluriform societies—the external environment E is decomposed for each subsyste
m nd then rewrite Equation 7a as follows: 
),...,,,,( 1,1,1,1,,  tltktjtiiti sssscs  (8) 
In a functionally differentiated system, the windowing of the subsystems upon each other becomes horizontal. 
Each subsystem (i) codes (ci) its own previous development and the development which it finds in its relevant 
environments. While the relation to the 
w
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 ),...,,,,( ,,,1,, tltktjtiiti sssscs   (9) 
The state of a subsystem (si,t)—and, therefore, of the system—is now dependent both on the previous state of this 
subsystem (si,t-1), and the current states of other subsystems. Equation 9 is incursive because the current state of 
another part of the same system is among the independent variables. 
In other words, the functionally differentiated system contains an additional Δt which can be used for a local 
reversal of the time axis and thus generate a transversal incursion which stands orthogonally to the longitudinal 
incursions provided by weak anticipation—using xt+1 = axt (1 – xt+1). Weak anticipation along the longitudinal axis is 
ava
nce to a previous 
ate of this technology and a reference to a current state of the se
eference to its own previous state, but one can expect all other subsystems to 
feedback upon this development as a relevant environment. Since each meaning-providing subsystem (i) also 
rovides meaning to its own development longitudinally, and the tw
can rewrite Equation 11 as follows: 
mber can vary in Luhmann’s theory with the historical development of 
the media of communication and the symbolic generalization of specific codes. When the various subsystems use 
ifferent frequencies for the updates, parameters have to be added to
Equation 12 and one obtains Equation 13: 
rtance of the different frequencies of selections—and the accordingly different parameters b—for the 
further development of the system will become manifest below when we study the interactions between these 
selection te lly hyper-
incursively. 
of possible meanings. As noted, Luhmann 
proposed that Husserl’s original concept of intersubjectivity needed to be refined: in addition to interactions at the 
micro-level, communication of meaning can als meso-level, and the fluxes of communication 
can be considered as self-organizing at the macro-level of society [45].  
ntional systems, the 
int
led and upon each other. The 
interactions of the models therefore generate selection environments of possible meanings [20].  
ilable within all intentional (sub)systems, that is, both at the psychological and social levels [20,23]. For 
example, the development of one subsystem of society (e.g., a technology i) contains both a refere
st lecting subsystem, e.g., the market j [44].  
The transversal incursion can be elaborated in a manner analogous to that of the incursive formulation of the 
logistic equation provided in Equation 5, but with an additional subscript for different subsystems: 
)1( xaxx   (10)  ,1,, tjtiti 
On the basis of Equation 10 one can generalize to Equation 11 for cases where a variety of subsystems provide 
additional selection environments for the development of subsystem i, as follows: 
 )1)(1)(1( ,,,1,, tltktjtiti xxxaxx    (11) 
Each subsystem (i) develops with r
p o types of meaning-providing can interact, one 
  


n
ijj
tjtiti xaxx
;1
,1,, )1(  (12) 
In Parsons’s structural-functionalism, the number of subsystems (n) was analytically restricted—given his so-
called four-function paradigm—but this nu
d  the corresponding selection mechanisms in 
  


n
ijj
tjjtiti xbaxx
;1
,1,, )1(  (13) 
The impo
rms in terms of both Equations 8 and 9, that is, recursively, incursively, and potentia
6. INTERACTION, ORGANIZATION, AND SELF-ORGANIZATION 
Social order cannot be considered as a stable phenomenon because it contains an order of reproduced 
expectations in addition to being organized. When the expectations operate upon one another and interact, they can 
be expected to generate a non-linear dynamics that processes meaning. Specific meanings can be stabilized, for 
example, in social institutions, but all meaning arises from a horizon 
o be organized at the 
6.1. Interaction  
While “double contingency” is a consequence of an internal model of relations between inte
eraction, organization, and self-organization of meaning can be considered as operations at the level of the 
models. These models operate selectively upon the systems which are mode
 9
In Equation 13, I specified selections upon selections as the pro
teraction between two incursive models can accordingly be modeled as fo
duct of the selective factors. The hyper-incursive 
in llows: 
 )1)(1( 11   ttt xxbx  (14a) 
 (14b) 2 1121/   ttt xxbx  
 
 0)   (14c) /1(2 12 1   bxxx ttt
bxx tt  11  (14d) 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
10000 10010
 b = 4
 b = 8
10020 10030
t →
10040 10050
x ↑
Linear ( b = 8)
 
FIGURE 7. Hyper-incursive interaction. 
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2
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x 
→
b  →
 
FIGURE 8. Two steady states of hyper-incursive interactions. 
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Figure 7 provides the simulation of this formula after 10,000 time-steps for b = 4 and b = 8, respectively. The 
auxiliary line is the linear regression line for b = 8 in this run. (The deviation from zero in the gradient is an effect of 
random fluctuations in choosing the plus or the minus signs in Equation 14d.) As expected, the interaction system 
swings from one side to the other, while sometimes staying on the same side for a number of iterations of the 
sim .  
Two steady states can be found by equating x  with x  in equat
 (
 
ulation. There is no progression in this system, nor can it come to an end
t+1 t
0)/1(22  bxxx
ion 14c: 
  (15a) 
 15b) 01)/12(2  xbx
)14()1( 2121  bx bb  (15c) 
While approaching to a single steady for b → ∞, the two steady states are continuous for variations in this 
parameter (Figure 8). 
 
6.2. Organization 
f-organization among the fluxes of communication 
re modeled differently in Equations 16 and 17, respectively: 
 
When a third term is added to Equation 14, we can obtain two formulas on the basis of Equations 8 and 9 above, 
respectively. I shall argue that this models the duality of structure which Giddens [26,46] specified in social theory 
[42]. Historical organizations of the interactions and potential sel
a
)1)(1( )1( 11 tttt xxxbx    
 
(16) 
)1)(1( )1( 111   tttt xxxbx  (17) 
Equation 17 models what Strydom [47] called a “triple contingency”: not only is there interaction, but a third 
party, i.e., a public, can be involved additionally. A public can only arise if a different code of communications was 
pre
one another [50] and thus to reduce the uncertainty in some configurations more than in others 
[19
ons 
mong intentional meaning-processing systems. Equation 16 can be dev
viously stabilized.  
When three selections operate upon one another, a complex dynamics is generated [48,49]. For example, as long 
as the relationship is dyadic, Equations 14 and 16 prevail as models for the selection environment of meaning. 
However, when a child is added to a couple, or when the relationship is legalized as a marriage, another social 
system of expectations is generated (e.g., at the tax office). The development of this complex system is henceforth 
“non-trivial” [33], whereas two (sub)dynamics may co-evolve along a historical trajectory in a predictable process of 
mutual shaping. In addition to mutual relations, three subsystems can be expected to develop positions in their 
relations among 
,51,52].  
Equation 16 modifies Equation 17 by bending the self-organization of the fluxes back to the historically present 
state. The self-organizing system can thus provide itself with a retention mechanism for the results of interacti
a eloped analogously to Equation 14 into: 
)1)(1( )1( 11 tttt xxxbx    (1
 
6a) 
  (16b) 0)]1(/[12 1
2
1   tttt xbxxx
)1(11 ttt xbxx   (16c) 
Figure 9 shows that the organization of hyper-incursive interactions in historical time is always temporary. The 
light-blue curve (for b = 10), for example, shows that when the organization is not sufficiently changed by new 
rounds of interaction, the organization becomes unstable and fades out (in this case at t = 6). Technically, this 
originates from the factor (1 – xt) in the nominator under the square root of Eq. 16c: when xt → 1, this nominator 
becomes zero, and xt+1 is no longer defined.5 (The computer program MS Excel provides erroneously a zero value 
for these undefined states.) Unlike interactions and—as we shall see below—self-organizations of meaning in fluxes 
of communications, organizations remain historical. The other two mechanisms (interaction and self-organization) 
                                                 
5 Daan van den Berg, personal communication, July 12, 2008. 
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are needed to “revive” the historical layer of organization at various moments of time by providing variation and 
next-order stability, respectively. 
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FIGURE 9. Organization of interactions for different values of the parameter b. 
 
.3. Self-organization 
Equation 17 can be developed as follows: 
 
6
)1)(1( )1( 111   tttt xxxbx  (17a) 
3
1 )1(  tt xb
x
  
 
(17b) 
1
31
1 


t
t x
b
x
 (17c) 
31
1 1   bt
 xx t  (17d) 
This equation has three roots of which two are complex. The real solution of 9d can (conventionally) be denoted as:  
 
 
3
1 1 b
xx tt 
  (18a) 
and the complex solutions are:  
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
  2
311 31
i
b
xx tt
 (18b) 
 
Since the further operation cannot evaluate the complex solutions in a next time-step, the system in this case has to 
continue with the real solution. This leads to a single and stable solution for each value of b. Are these perhaps 
Luhmann’s [53:e.g., 394, 1127] “eigenvalues”? 
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FIGURE 10. Real and complex roots of the cubic equation in the case of three selections operating upon one another. 
 
Figure 10 provides the steady state values for different values of the parameter b. The curve of the imaginary part 
goes asymptotically to zero. Changes in b—because of the concurrent operation of organizing meaning in historical 
time by using Equation 16—can move the system along the lines in Figure 8. At each moment, however, the system 
quickly converges on a single steady state. 
My thesis [19] is that in a modern and pluriform society which is functionally differentiated in terms of 
(symbolically generalized) codes of communication in subsystems, the recombination and temporary reintegration 
of these codes in organizations can change the system by reorganizing it (e.g., in a techno-economic co-evolution). 
Therewith the value of the parameter b is potentially changed in a next round, and the self-organization in the 
horizon of meanings can be expected to change accordingly. Thus, the two layers of the social system can auto-
catalytically drive each other while controlling the uncertainty. 
7. DISCUSSION  
The simulation of organizations showed that the organization of meaning exchange is temporary. Interactions are 
continuously providing variation; self-organization structures the system of meaning exchanges in terms of codes of 
communication. The self-organization of meaning in communication provided a single solution for all values of the 
parameter (b). However, the system and subsystems are both concurrent and nested: under the condition of 
functional differentiation among the subsystems, each subsystem can be expected to provide its own solution 
(eigenvalue b’ ) for the self-organization when observed from the system’s level. Figure 11 [23:411] provides a 
visualization for this nesting of intra- and intersystem anticipation. 
Change comes from the different parameter values at the subsystems level which respectively converge on 
different roots of the cubic equations. These values are recombined historically by a specific organization at the 
meso-level of the (next-order) system. Using Luhmann’s theory, one can associate the specificity of the various 
constants (that is, the converging roots of the cubic equations) with the functionally differentiated codes of 
communication in the respective subsystems.  
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FIGURE 11. Intra and Inter-Anticipation. Source: [23:411]. 
 
The differentiation among the codes is not only a static differentiation among eigenvectors, but also a 
differentiation in terms of frequencies [43]. For example, a political system can be expected to operate with an 
election cycle of four years, while science operates in terms of quarterly journals and annual meetings. The economy 
updates with prices and stock markets on an almost daily basis.  
Luhmann’s social systems theory was hitherto mainly formalized using Spencer Brown’s (1969) Laws of Form 
[54,55]. Spencer Brown distinguished between two states: the ‘marked’ and the ‘unmarked.’ Luhmann [e.g., 38]—
and many others—have believed that this distinction could be used for the development of a general calculus 
[39,56,57]. However, Spencer Brown’s marks are made at specific moments of time. Their recursive elaboration 
leads to a topology [39,55], but not to a calculus.  
In a later discussion, Spencer Brown [58:51] added the possibility of an evolutionary process, but he formulated 
this mathematically as only an oscillation between the two states. An oscillation can, for example, be produced by 
the logistic equation (3 ≤ a < 4). However, my algorithmic equations were specified on the basis of substantive 
theorizing about the communication of meaning in social system [cf. 56:20,59]. In other words, the evolutionary 
theorist is not interested only in the momentary existence of an observer or a second-order observer, but also in 
developments over time in terms of specific operations [57,59,60].  
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, I constructed a relation between Dubois’ incursive and hyper-incursive equations of strongly 
anticipatory systems [1,8,9] and Luhmann’s social systems theory [6,14]. I used both theories heuristically and 
perhaps eclectically because the construction of a relation requires a creative translation of the one theory into the 
other. Luhmann [6:605, 14:446f.], for example, formulated that “(s)elf-referential, autopoietic reproduction would 
not be possible without an anticipatory recursivity.” However, Luhmann did not specify this mechanism.  
In his summarizing chef-d’oeuvre of 1997 [53], Luhmann provided two references to Robert Rosen’s  
Anticipatory Systems [17], but both were framed in a biological context [53: 206 and 820]. He added (at p. 821) that 
in the domain of meaningful processing of information one cannot avoid a reference to the present when defining 
the relation between past and future; consequently, time has to be conceptualized as a dimension. Luhmann’s time-
dimension with the present at its origin can further be elaborated as a degree of freedom in the theory and 
computation of anticipatory systems.  
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In other contexts, Luhmann developed a semantics for the discussion of “time” [61: 98, n.10], but for my 
argument other elements of social-systems theory are more important than these historical elaborations. Luhmann 
[53] draws two main axes of differentiation within social systems: social differentiation and systems differentiation. 
Social differentiation in the communication is possible because communication can be coded differently and codes 
of communication can be generalized symbolically. For example, one can code communication economically, 
scientifically or politically. Money, power, validity, affection, trust, etc., can be used to shortcut communication and 
thus to process more complexity [62,63]. The different function systems operate in parallel, but not synchronously. 
As Luhmann formulated: “Social differentiation serves as an uncoupling mechanism. It divides the time-orientations 
in the different systems and therefore accepts that things can be urgent in one system, while another system can take 
its time.”[61:128] 
Systems differentiation organizes the social system at different levels. Face-to-face communication or interaction 
among incursive systems remains the micro-operation for strong anticipation in the processing of meaning. Hyper-
incursion models the double contingency which is naturally given among reflexive agents. However, 
communications can also be organized at the meso-level.6 At the macro-level of society, Luhmann [12] proposed to 
use Maturana & Varela’s [35] concept of autopoiesis or self-organization: interhuman coordination is possible 
because meaning can also be communicated (e.g., using languages or symbolic codes of communication). The 
differentiation of micro-level interaction, meso-level organization, and macro-level self-organization in the 
communication of meaning was elaborated in terms of different equations which represent the selection 
environments of intentional systems. Some meanings can be retained in the knowledge base of this system as more 
meaningful than others. 
The model of recursive perturbations allowed us to consider both Spencer Brown’s formulae and the various 
formulations of the logistic map as species of a family of equations. The spanning of the time dimension enables us 
to dissolve the paradoxes in social-systems theory (as in the above case of Equation 7). The theory and computation 
of anticipatory systems further develops the time dimension into a degree of freedom which can be studied in the 
forward and/or backward mode. The duality of structure in the social system [26,46] could thus be considered as the 
result of a difference in the time-subscripts of Equations 16 and 17 (above). Note that these equations are no longer 
exclusively based on the model of recursive perturbations or the logistic map. In addition to the bifurcation 
parameter a, a second parameter b is involved in modeling the non-linear dynamics of meaning-processing at the 
supra-individual level. 
In summary: Leydesdorff & Dubois [22] showed that the social system can be considered as inherently 
anticipatory because of its distributedness at each moment in time. This distribution can be organized in terms of a 
functional differentiation among subsystems which can operate asynchronously and thus generate another ∆t. 
Reflexivity and intentionality add a second (longitudinal) anticipatory mechanism to all intentional (sub)systems. 
The two mechanisms can be combined into a strongly anticipatory mechanism of meaning-processing [20]. A 
strongly anticipatory system co-constructs its next stages as one of its subdynamics. The social system provides us 
with a natural example of such a system.  
Marx already in 1867 expressed this expectation of a dynamics at the supra-individual level as the autonomous 
accumulation of capital [64]. Nowadays, we are able to refine this accumulation as the fragile progression of a 
knowledge-based economy [19].  
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